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Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity
 
 Derk Pereboom
Structuralist theories describe the entities in their domains solely in terms of 
relations. At the same time, they purport to be complete theories of the entities 
in their domains. For example, a standard variety of structuralism about mental 
entities, external-relations functionalism, aims to provide a complete theory of 
the mental by specifying solely the relations mental states have to sensory inputs, 
behavioral outputs, and other mental states. Since their inception, structuralist 
theories have been controversial precisely because they claim to be complete 
while yet specifying entities solely in terms of relations. What recommends 
structuralism is that it satisfies a certain ideal of objectivity, and structuralists 
often at least implicitly claim that for non-structuralist theories this ideal is beyond 
reach. However, the link between structure and objectivity is not transparent, 
and requires investigation.
 We can illuminate the contours of this debate by way of a historical inquiry, 
beginning with Descartes’s reaction to the medieval Aristotelian theory of matter. 
In Thomas Aquinas’s Aristotelian conception, matter has two metaphysical 
components; first, the form of quantity, that is, three-dimensional spatial extension, 
and second, that which is extended in matter, which in the Aristotelian view 
is known as prime matter (prima materia).1 In Aquinas’s position, prime matter 
in itself is not extended; in fact, in itself it has no forms at all. This has the 
consequence that in itself it is not intelligible, since things are intelligible only 
by way of form. Moreover, prime matter is pure potentiality, and thus in itself it 
is not actual; matter is made actual by form.
 For the seventeenth century modern philosophers, prime matter is 
an unattractive theoretical posit. A key concern is its unknowability and 
unintelligibility. In his response, Descartes proposes that matter is just extension 
in three dimensions, endorsing the intelligible component of Aquinas’s theory, 
and deleting its unintelligible element, prime matter. Since space is also defined 
as extension in three dimensions, matter and space are identical by definition. 
As we shall now see, we can understand Descartes’s proposal as a structuralist 
conception of matter, arguably the first structuralist theory to be advanced. Yet 
it is Leibniz who first saw that Descartes’s theory is a structuralist one, and it is 
in response to Leibniz that Kant formulates the long-standing core objection to 
structuralism, one that is reiterated throughout the history of philosophy from 
Kant to Derrida.
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Leibniz and the Demand for Absolutely Intrinsic Properties
Structuralist theories specify entities solely in terms of relational or equivalently, 
extrinsic properties. What this characterization leaves out are intrinsic properties 
or non-relational properties.2 Leibniz contends that a theory of the physical 
that does not include intrinsic properties of a certain fundamental sort is in an 
important sense incomplete, and an examination of Descartes’s conception of 
matter that reveals why this is so.3 Leibniz argues that the Cartesian theory is 
unsatisfying for the reason that extension is in an important sense an extrinsic 
property, and that any ultimately real thing cannot feature only properties that 
are extrinsic in this way, but must possess intrinsic properties, in a contrasting 
sense, as well; "there is no denomination so extrinsic that it does not have an 
intrinsic denomination at its basis. This is itself one of my principal doctrines 
(kyriai doxai)."4
 First of all, Leibniz’s formulation of this doctrine—let’s call it his Intrinsicness 
Principle—indicates that in his conception properties can be more and less 
extrinsic. Extrinsic properties might have intrinsic aspects. For example, being 
wise is an extrinsic property of Sophie since it involves a relation to a comparison 
class. But being wise also includes an intrinsic aspect--having a certain type and 
level of intelligence. Being wise is plausibly a complex property that has at least 
one extrinsic and one intrinsic aspect, and thus it is not a maximally extrinsic 
property of hers. This suggests the notion of a property so thoroughly extrinsic 
that it lacks any intrinsic aspect: 
P is a purely extrinsic property of X just in case P is an extrinsic 
property of X and P has no intrinsic aspects.
Being one of a plurality and being to the left of are candidates for purely extrinsic 
properties.
 Now to Leibniz’s objection to Descartes one might initially reply that properties 
like having such and such an extension and being spherical are paradigmatically 
intrinsic properties of things. But Leibniz has in mind that a sphere’s extension 
is not intrinsic to it in a more fundamental sense.5 First, he maintains that there 
remains a respect in which the extension of a thing is extrinsic:
Nor do I think that extension can be conceived in itself, 
but I consider it an analyzable and relative concept, for it 
can be resolved into plurality, continuity, and coexistence 
or the existence of parts at one and the same time.6
Leibniz is proposing that the extension of the sphere can be analyzed as, or 
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reduces to, the plurality, continuity, and coexistence of parts of the sphere. 
Properties of each of these three types are plausibly purely extrinsic properties of 
these parts; being one of a collection of more than one thing, being continuous 
with other things, and coexisting with other things are all excellent candidates 
for purely extrinsic properties of whatever has them. So it may be that P is an 
intrinsic property of X, while P is not in a sense fundamentally intrinsic to X, 
or, as James van Cleve points out, in Kant’s terminology, not absolutely intrinsic 
to X.7 This is so when X’s having P can be analyzed as, or reduces to, X’s parts 
having properties Q, R, S ... , and these properties are purely extrinsic properties 
of these parts. We can specify, then, that
P is an absolutely intrinsic property of X just in case P is an intrinsic 
property of X, and X’s having P does not reduce to parts of X 
having purely extrinsic properties.
By contrast, also in Kant’s terminology,
P is a comparatively (or a relatively) intrinsic property of X just in 
case P is an intrinsic property of X, and X’s having P reduces to 
parts of X having purely extrinsic properties.8
Thus the extension of a sphere, if Leibniz’s claim about the reduction of the 
property of extension is correct, is only a comparatively intrinsic property of it. 
At this point one might object that the Cartesian sphere’s extension does not 
reduce to parts of the sphere having purely extrinsic properties, for the reason 
that the parts have an intrinsic property that serves as the foundation for the 
extrinsic properties. But in Descartes’s conception of matter, these parts consist 
just in extension, for the extension of each of these parts reduces in the same way 
as the extension of the original body: to the plurality, continuity, and coexistence 
of their parts. Moreover, the extension of the parts of these parts is subject to 
the same reduction, and so on to infinity. In such a protracted analysis of the 
extension of the sphere, nothing other than purely extrinsic properties of parts 
is to be encountered. Thus, on the Cartesian theory, matter features only purely 
relational, that is, structural properties.
 To this structuralist conception Leibniz objects that it is implausible that 
material things feature only purely extrinsic properties:
But it would appear from this that something must always be 
assumed which is continuous or diffused, such as the white in 
milk, the color, ductility, and weight in gold, and resistance in 
matter. For by itself, continuity (for extension is nothing but 
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simultaneous continuity) no more constitutes substance than 
does multitude or number, where something is necessary to be 
numbered, repeated, and continued.9
Leibniz’s concern is the one that has historically been compelling. It can formulated 
this way: for any substantial entity, there must be some absolutely intrinsic property 
that confers on it its substantive character--one might call a property of this sort 
a substantival absolutely intrinsic property.10
 In this last passage Leibniz represents the absolutely intrinsic property of a 
material thing as that which has extension, or more specifically, as that which 
is continuous in matter. His positive proposal is to attribute force to matter as 
the missing intrinsic property. The passage continues: "So I believe that our 
thinking is completed and ended in the concept of force rather than in that of 
extension. And we need seek no other concept of power or force than that it is 
the attribute from which change arises, and whose subject is substance itself."11 
To preclude the outcome that matter has only purely extrinsic and comparatively 
intrinsic properties, Leibniz requires a property that withstands reduction to purely 
extrinsic properties. But can force have this role? Consider gravitational force, 
for instance. Plausibly, the gravitational force exerted by a sphere on another 
body is a function of the gravitational force exerted by its parts, but this force is 
not obviously reducible to purely extrinsic properties of its parts. Accordingly, 
there may be properties of type T that are intrinsic to material thing X, and while 
X has P by virtue of its parts having certain properties, X has P by virtue of its 
parts having properties precisely of type T itself, and these properties are intrinsic 
to these parts. These parts have these properties by virtue of their parts having 
intrinsic properties of type T, ad infinitum. If force satisfies these conditions, then 
a material thing’s having force will be an absolutely intrinsic property of it.
 It is important to note, as the above reasoning shows, that force can be an 
absolutely intrinsic property even if there are no fundamental material entities 
due to the fact that material things are composed of more basic entities to infinity, 
and thus no fundamental entity has force. This possibility is accommodated by 
the notion of an absolutely intrinsic property as we have defined it above. The 
Leibnizian Intrinsicness Principle, which now might be formulated as follows,
(Intrinsicness Principle, first pass) Any substantial entity must 
have at least one substantival absolutely intrinsic property,
does not depend for its plausibility on there being a fundamental material.12
 It is also important to note that Leibniz maintains that force in matter is 
not an absolutely intrinsic property of a material substance. For him, material 
or physical force is derivative force, and he suggests that it is the phenomenal 
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appearance of a non-physical primitive force, an intrinsic property of a non-physical 
monad. Primitive force is a law-governed tendency of a monad to pass from one 
perception to another.13 For Leibniz, the underlying ground of primitive force is 
found in the representational states of the monad, and it is these non-physical 
representational states that ultimately supply the missing absolutely intrinsic 
properties. This account features no absolutely intrinsic physical properties. In 
Leibniz’s mature conception, this is arguably part of the explanation for why 
physical things are not real or substantial in the fundamental sense, and are 
rather only well-founded phenomena (phenomena bene fundata). The fact that 
physical derivative force has a foundation in absolutely intrinsic properties of a 
monad allows physical things to be real or substantial in this lower-grade sense.
 For what reason did Leibniz advocate this mentalist or idealist position? Kant’s 
diagnosis of Leibniz on this issue—read ‘absolutely intrinsic’ for ‘intrinsic’—is 
compelling:
As object of pure understanding, on the other hand, every 
substance must have intrinsic determinations and powers which 
pertain to its intrinsic reality. But what intrinsic accidents can 
I entertain in thought, save only those which my inner sense 
presents to me? They must be something which is either itself 
a thinking or analogous to thinking. For this reason Leibniz, 
regarding substances as noumena, took away from them, by the 
manner in which he conceived them, whatever might signify 
extrinsic relation, including also, therefore, composition, and so 
made them all, even the constituents of matter, simple subjects 
with powers of representation—in a word, MONADS.14
On Kant’s suggestion, the only absolutely intrinsic properties we can conceive are 
mental, and that this is the source of Leibnizian idealism.
Kant’s Claim of Ignorance
Kant denies that we have knowledge or cognition (Erkenntnis) of any absolutely 
intrinsic properties of material things:15
All that we cognize in matter is nothing but relations (lauter 
Verhältnisse). What we call the intrinsic determinations of it are 
intrinsic only in a comparative sense (nur komparativ innerlich), but 
among these relations some are self-subsistent and permanent, 
and through these we are given a determinate object.16
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In material things we cognize comparatively intrinsic properties, but no absolutely 
intrinsic properties. This is not merely an epistemic claim. Kant contends that 
all properties of matter, substantia phaenomenon, even its apparently intrinsic 
properties reduce to those that are purely intrinsic: “It is quite otherwise with a 
substantia phaenomenon in space; its intrinsic determinations are nothing but mere 
relations, and it itself is entirely made up of mere relations" (but this is consistent 
with some of these relations being “self-subsistent and permanent”).17 Kant is thus 
a structuralist about matter—for him there are no absolutely intrinsic physical 
properties. In the subsequent sentence, Kant mentions force as a feature of matter: 
"We are acquainted with substance in space only through forces which are active 
in this and that space, either bringing objects to it (attraction), or preventing 
them penetrating into it (repulsion and impenetrability)," so for him force is in 
the last analysis an extrinsic property of material things.18 In Kant's conception, 
force is ultimately an extrinsic property because it is a relation among material 
items, or, more abstractly, spatial points. The section on dynamics in Kant’s 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science specifies there are two kinds of force, 
attractive and repulsive. Attractive force is by definition the cause by which two 
points approach one another, and repulsive force is by definition the cause by 
which two points recede from another.19
 Kant admits that there is something unintuitive about his view that all of 
the properties of matter are relational: "It is certainly startling to hear that a 
thing is to be taken as consisting wholly of relations."20 However, this apparent 
implausibility can be explained away: "Such a thing is, however, mere appearance, 
and cannot be thought through pure categories: what it itself consists in is the 
mere relation of something in general to the senses."21 Because matter is only 
appearance, it need not have any physical absolutely intrinsic properties. If matter 
were not merely appearance, but a thing in itself, then it would possess such 
absolutely intrinsic properties. In making these claims, Kant indicates that he does 
not fundamentally reject the Leibnizian doctrine that intrinsic properties must 
ground extrinsic properties. If he did, he would not sense the need to explain the 
plausibility of matter’s having only purely extrinsic and comparatively intrinsic 
properties by declaring that it is only appearance. What Kant accepts is that the 
extrinsic properties of mind-independently real substantial entities--things in 
themselves--must be grounded in absolutely intrinsic properties. This suggests a 
revised statement of the Intrinsicness Principle:
(Intrinsicness Principle, Kantian version) Any mind-
independently real substantial entity must have at least one 
substantival absolutely intrinsic property,
which I think best captures the metaphysical intuition that drives anti-structuralist 
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positions in the history of philosophy and of science.
 Let us now turn to the link between structuralism and objectivity. Kant 
supposes that the marks of a true science include human rational agreement in 
methodology and results.22 Here is a characterization of the sort of intersubjective 
accessibility that would facilitate this type of agreement:
X is rationally intersubjectively accessible just in case X’s existence 
and defining properties (or essence) can be known either directly 
through intuitions and observations available to any subject 
with a reasonably powerful cognitive and sensory apparatus, 
or indirectly through deduction, induction, or abduction from 
such intuitions and observations, together with background 
conditions.
In the philosophical tradition, this sort of rational intersubjective accessibility is a 
paradigmatic kind of objectivity. Kant is in effect arguing that for us, no substantival 
absolutely intrinsic properties are rationally intersubjectively accessible, and thus 
no theory of such properties is objective in this sense.
Arguing for Ignorance about Absolutely Intrinsic Properties
But why should we think that we lack knowledge of which substantival absolutely 
intrinisic properties are actual, and that this ignorance is irremediable? Kant gives 
us an indication of why he thinks we lack such knowledge, but his suggestions 
are unconvincing. As I shall now contend, we need to go beyond Kant for the 
most plausible argument for the kind of ignorance at issue.
 Rae Langton has developed an influential interpretation of Kant’s argument 
for such ignorance, which has been extensively discussed and revised by Van 
Cleve.23 Langton and Van Cleve cast it as an argument for ignorance about all 
intrinsic properties, but it should rather be construed as targeting solely knowledge 
of absolutely intrinsic properties.24 The argument begins with the premise that 
human knowledge depends on sensibility, and sensibility is receptive. We can 
have knowledge of an object only in so far as it causes us to be in some state. 
Furthermore, we can know that an object has some property only if from the 
fact that it causes us to be in that state we can deduce that it has the property. 
However, if the property in question is absolutely intrinsic, we cannot make the 
deduction. We cannot deduce what absolutely intrinsic properties objects have 
from the effects they have on us, since there will always be alternative possibilities 
for those properties that cannot be ruled out. Thus for any absolutely intrinsic 
property of an object, we cannot know that the object has it.25
 Van Cleve’s objection to this argument (or the one that concludes ignorance 
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of all intrinsic properties) is that the deducibility condition on knowledge it 
presupposes is too strict and therefore implausible.26 To know that an object 
has a property, it is not required that the possibility of all other options be ruled 
out, and this requirement is presupposed by the claim that the object’s having 
the property be deducible from what we know. He suggests that the requirement 
be counterfactual rather than deductive; for example, it might be sensitivity: if 
object A didn’t have property F, we wouldn’t believe that it was F; or safety: we 
would believe that A is F only if it were F. Supposing the deductive requirement, 
we would know little, including, for example, the relations that physical objects 
have to one another, since we are unable to deducce these relations from their 
effects on us. In addition, it is not clear from the relevant texts that this argument 
is what Kant had in mind.
 The argument for ignorance about absolutely intrinsic categorical properties 
animated by deducibility condition on knowledge assumes that knowledge of 
such properties would be inferential. Kant also entertains the possibility that 
knowledge of such properties would be immediate. But in his view we cannot have 
immediate knowledge, that is, intuition, of such properties, and this limitation 
issues in another argument for ignorance about absolutely intrinsic properties: 
If the complaints–that we have no insight whatsoever into 
the intrinsic [properties] of things (das Innere der Dinge)—are to 
mean that we do not conceive by pure understanding what the 
things that appear to us may be in themselves, they are entirely 
illegitimate and unreasonable. For what is demanded is that we 
should be able to know things, and therefore to intuit them, 
without senses, and therefore that we should have a faculty of 
knowledge altogether different from the human, and this not 
only in degree but also in intuition and kind—and thus that 
we should be not humans but beings of whom we are unable 
to say whether they are even possible, much less how they are 
constituted. (A277/B333)
Here Kant identifies absence of insight into things in themselves with absence of 
insight into the intrinsic [properties] of things. We have reason to suppose that 
Kant means these properties to be absolutely and not just comparatively intrinsic 
(since we can have knowledge of the comparatively intrinsic properties through 
observation and analysis of appearances). This argument for ignorance hinges on 
the claim that we have no intuition, that is, immediate or direct representation 
of absolutely intrinsic properties.27
 However, it is plausible that a sound argument for ignorance of absolutely 
intrinsic properties cite only our inability to intuit them? Kant himself maintains 
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that we can have knowledge of unobservable properties of physical things, even 
though we lack intuition of these properties: “from the perception of the attracted 
iron filings we know of the existence of a magnetic matter pervading all bodies, 
although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from all immediate perception 
of this medium.”28 Clearly, we can have knowledge of categorical and intrinsic 
physical properties, for example, of the intrinsic structural properties that water 
has, even though we do not intuit them—we lack direct acquaintance with them. 
However, as Alyssa Ney asks, why could science then not determine the intrinsic 
properties that ultimately ground the physical world?29
 The property being H
2
O is an intrinsic property of water, and we know that 
water has it. We possess this knowledge, despite our lack of intuition or direct 
acquaintance with this property, due to the fact that we conceived a model for the 
unobserved basis for explanations involving water that has been experimentally and 
theoretically confirmed. In principle, could we acquire knowledge of absolutely 
intrinsic properties in just this way? We might imagine: physics provides a model 
for the fundamental particles in which their absolutely intrinsic property is X. 
The model turns out to be so explanatorily impressive that it yields abductive 
knowledge (knowledge from best explanation) that X is actually instantiated.
 But even given this abductive model, it is still plausible that we currently 
lack knowledge of which absolutely intrinsic properties are actual. We have 
conceived different candidates for such properties that have not been abductively 
ruled out, and it is clearly open that we have not yet conceived all of the viable 
candidates. Which candidates for absolutely intrinsic properties have we conceived? 
Aristotelians propose prime matter, Locke suggests perfect solidity,30 and Leibniz 
develops a model in which the absolute intrinsic properties are mental properties 
of immaterial entities. It would seem far from certain that any candidate that 
has been proposed is actually instantiated, and it might well be that there are 
possibilities for such properties that we do not understand that are also relevant 
alternatives.
 Thus we have come to an argument for ignorance about absolutely intrinsic 
properties from the premise that there are a plurality of options in the running 
for such properties, only some of which we now understand, more than one of 
which is a candidate for the best explanation of the relevant phenomena, and 
none of which now decisively wins out. The conclusion does not claim permanent 
ignorance, but a kind that is potentially remediable. Correlatively, even though 
no conception of which absolutely intrinsic properties are actually instantiated 
currently commands intersubjective rational agreement, it is not ruled out 
that there is one that might, which would thus be objective in this sense. This 
contrasts with Kant’s view, according to which no such conception could ever 
yield intersubjective rational agreement for us, and thus about such properties 
there is no objective theory in this sense.
10
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Twentieth-Century Structuralism and Anti-Structuralism
The twentieth century witnessed the development of structuralist theories in 
various fields. In the 1920’s, a highly general structuralist account of reality was 
set out by Rudolf Carnap, a member of the Vienna Circle of logical positivists, 
in his The Logical Construction of the World (Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, 1928).31 
The initial phase of Carnap’s account aims to demonstrate that the phenomenal 
language we commonly use to describe our experiential world is translatable into 
a phenomenal language that features no monadic (non-relational) predicates and 
only one kind of relation: recollected phenomenal similarity in some respect.32 
This canonical phenomenal language is in turn claimed to be translatable into 
a physical language that features no monadic but only relational predicates. In 
the final phase, the conjunction of all the sentences in this relational physical 
language is converted into a Ramsey sentence, in which the referring terms are 
replaced by existentially quantified variables, and the relational predicates are 
also replaced by variables.33 The particular content of the physical relational 
predicates is discarded, leaving only descriptions that abstract away from this 
content. The intended consequence is a complete description of the world in a 
logical language of relations—a purely structural language.
 In Carnap’s scheme, what has become of the absolutely intrinsic properties, 
about which metaphysicians conflict? Any sentences with terms for such intrinsic 
properties will be translated into purely structural sentences, with the aim of 
eliminating these terms. Certain contemporary functionalist projects about the 
mental are similar. According to one kind of external-relations functionalism, 
the content of phenomenal experience is expressed as relations among sensory 
inputs, behavioral outputs, and other mental states, eliminating phenomenal 
terminology.
 The logical positivists aimed to set out an account of the world that is objective 
in the sense of rational intersubjective accessibility, and Carnap’s structuralism 
is one such attempt. Here again is our characterization which is in fact loosely 
based on Herbert Feigl’s:34
X is rationally intersubjectively accessible just in case X’s existence 
and defining properties (or essence) can be known either directly 
through intuitions and observations available to any subject 
with a reasonably powerful cognitive and sensory apparatus, 
or indirectly through deduction, induction, or abduction from 
such intuitions and observations and background conditions.
In the Aufbau, what makes the physical a prime candidate for objectivity in this 
sense is that the canonical physical language is purely relational or structural. It 
11
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is so at least partly because it eliminates terms for absolutely intrinsic properties, 
which defy rational intersubjective acessibility.
 A crucial question for Carnap is whether the ordinary phenomenal language of 
experience can in fact be translated without loss of content into physical-structural 
or logical-structural sentences. This issue has been a focus of disagreement. But 
a further concern is whether such structural sentences can completely describe 
entities that are objective in a different sense, that of being metaphysically 
objectively real:
X is metaphysically objectively real just in case X’s existence, and 
X’s essential nature, are independent of how X is perceived or 
conceptualized.35
Something’s being objectively real in this way does not require that it be rationally 
intersubjectively accessible. Thomas Nagel argues that there may be metaphysically 
objectively real things that we cannot conceive.36 In addition, our notion of 
intersubjective accessibility does not demand that intersubjectively accessible 
things be metaphysically objectively real. Kant maintained, for instance, that 
physical things are intersubjectively accessible but not objectively real in the 
metaphysical sense just defined.
 Carnap intended to set metaphysics aside, and with it the metaphysical 
notion of the objectively real. The only significant notion of objectivity is a 
kind of intersubjective accessibility, and insofar as the physical is a notion of 
objectivity, it is characterized in such terms, and not as metaphysical objective 
reality. Here one Kantian theme is continued in Carnap. Kant maintained that 
because the physical features no absolutely intrinsic properties, it cannot be 
mind-independently objectively real. Still, it can be objective in the sense that 
our theorizing about it potentially achieves general rational agreement. However, 
since the post-positivist renaissance of metaphysics, philosophers have generally 
assumed that physicalism is a thesis about what is metaphysically objectively real, 
not merely a claim about what is objective in the sense of rational intersubjective 
accessibility. However, then the question about the reality and nature of absolutely 
intrinsic properties surfaces again, since they might be required for metaphysical 
objective reality, and this issue can no longer be set aside as it was by the logical 
positivists.
 Carnap held that structuralism extends to all of the sciences by virtue of the 
doctrine of the unity of science. Famously, Ferdinand de Saussure developed 
a structuralist conception of language, and Claude Lévi-Strauss advocated 
structuralist theories in sociology and anthropology.37 But beginning in the 1960’s, 
structuralism met with the post-structuralist reaction. It is interesting to note that 
Jacques Derrida’s central criticism of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism is that a structural 
Structuralism, Anti-Structuralism and Objectivity    49
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description presupposes what he calls a center that is not itself structural but is 
rather inner or intrinsic. Even though structuralists try to theorize without such 
a center, the sense that it is required is inescapable. Here Derrida is expressing 
the Leibnizian/Kantian intuition that we have set out.38 But furthermore, a 
defining feature of Derrida’s position is a denial of Kant’s optimism about the 
possibility of achieving scientific knowledge given ignorance of the absolutely 
intrinsic properties. Kant endorses the view that the sciences can be successful 
and purely structural, while Derrida claims that our ignorance of intrinsic 
properties will constrain the success of any attempt at systematic knowledge. For 
any purely structural system—a text, in Derrida’s vocabulary—any attempt to fix 
an interpretation of it, which involves consideration only of structural relations 
(les différences), will result in deferring such an attempt to consideration of yet 
further relations. But even the entire system of structural relations will not fix 
a particular interpretation. As a result, interpretation, and scientific endeavor 
more generally, face a limit, which gives rise to Derrida’s deconstructive proposal, 
according to which any claim to a single privileged interpretation of a text can 
be undermined.39
 Thus Kant and Derrida concur in accepting the Leibnizian Intrinsicness 
Principle, and the claim of ignorance of absolutely intrinsic properties. But 
they differ on the implications of this ignorance. Kant maintains that human 
scientific theory can advance unaffected, since he holds that a complete science 
of empirical phenomena can be developed without knowledge of the underlying 
absolutely intrinsic properties. Such ignorance is compatible with a body of 
scientific knowledge that is objective in the sense of rational intersubjective 
accessibility. But Derrida is not similarly optimistic about the degree to which 
scientific knowledge can proceed impervious to our ignorance of these underlying 
properties.
 Thus, despite differing with Carnap on the truth of the Intrinsicness Principle, 
Kant and Carnap concur that the sciences of the world of experience can be 
complete and purely structural. And even though Derrida agrees with Kant on the 
truth of the Intrinsicness Principle and on our ignorance of absolutely intrinsic 
properties, he denies that the sciences can be complete and at the same time 
structural and objective as specified by the criterion of rational intersubjective 
accessibility. Our ignorance of these non-structural intrinsic properties will render 
the sciences incomplete, and will also preclude objectivity in this sense.40
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